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Abuse of Property Right Without Political 
Foundations: A Response to Katz 
Mitchell N. Berman 
 Suppose that Oliver owns Blackacre, a parcel adjacent to Whiteacre, 
owned by Teresa. Oliver erects a large sculpture on Blackacre along the shared 
property line. The sculpture conforms to zoning regulations. But Oliver erects 
it in order to block Teresa’s access to light. Is he legally entitled to do so?   
 Common law jurisdictions standardly hold that he is: property law does 
not inquire into an owner’s motives or reasons for exercising his property 
rights.1 Put differently, the scope of property rights is generally thought to be 
insensitive to an owner’s motives or reasons. Larissa Katz maintains that this 
black letter rule, put so starkly, is neither faithful to the case law nor 
normatively attractive. In her recent article, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional 
Principle of Abuse of Property Right,2 Katz elaborates and defends a general 
principle of abuse of property right—a principle that would judge Oliver’s 
conduct to be abusive.3 
 I argue in this Essay that Katz is broadly right about abuse of property 
right—but for the wrong reason. Katz grounds her abuse-of-right principle in a 
particular theory of property ownership. Her account is therefore (and 
avowedly) particular to the use and abuse of property rights; it does not arise 
from principles that are general to other legal departments nor does it bear 
implications for the resolution of other legal problems. That, I contend, is a 
mistake—and a costly one. By rooting the plausible principle that she favors in 
 
1. A locus classicus is Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
2. Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 Yale 
L.J. 1444 (2013). 
3. What “abusive” means and whether it is equivalent to “impermissible” or “illegal” is not 
entirely clear. On one hand, Katz explains that “a principle of abuse of property right makes 
sense of a range of judicial responses to spiteful or extortionate uses of ownership. This 
single principle can illuminate remedial tinkering (e.g., substituting damages for 
injunctions), denying the right to exclude, and even treating the abusive behavior as itself a 
nuisance.” Id. at 1449 (footnote omitted). I take this to suggest that “abusive” is not 
equivalent to “impermissible from the legal point of view.”  On the other hand, Katz’s 
apparent agreement that it is paradoxical for it to be true both that one has a legal right to φ 
and that one’s φing is abusive legally speaking, see infra note 20, suggests a contrary 
position. 
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property-specific grounds that prove highly doubtful, Katz obscures from view 
any possible consilience among the abuse-of-property principle and kindred 
legal principles outside the property arena. I aim to bring those connections to 
the surface. 
Part I summarizes Katz’s account. Part II criticizes one of its two main 
components: Katz’s novel theory of ownership. Part III introduces the 
unsurprising suggestion that property doctrines that police abusive exercise of 
property rights are products of general moral principles against purposefully or 
knowingly harming others, and observes that Katz is likely to eschew this 
straightforward defense of abuse of property right on the ground that it is 
“external” and for that reason less promising or valuable than the “internal” 
account that she favors. Part III argues, however, that Katz’s apparent reasons 
for disfavoring external limits on property rights are unpersuasive. Part IV 
bolsters the credentials of an external reasons-based restriction on exercise of 
property rights by sketching deep similarities among abuse of property, 
informational blackmail, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
i .  katz in brief  
Katz’s argument has two main components. The first is an account and 
endorsement of a particular construal of the principle of abuse of property 
right. According to the principle Katz defends, an owner abuses her property 
rights with respect to a thing she owns if she makes an otherwise permitted 
decision about how to use the thing solely in order to harm others, either as an 
end in itself (“spite”) or as a means to induce others to act as the owner desires 
(“leverage”). This is a substantive claim about the limits of a property owner’s 
rights.  I will call it the “No-Intent-To-Harm Principle,” or “the NITH 
Principle,” for short. 
The second component of Katz’s argument is a defense or grounding of 
that principle in a normative political-theoretical account of ownership. 
Property ownership is always morally problematic, Katz contends, because 
“[w]hen someone is granted ownership authority to determine the agenda for 
her property, she is then in a position to make decisions that bind us all,”4 
thereby impinging on the autonomy of others. But we cannot insist that 
nobody make such decisions, for that would entail that nobody could use 
anything. “We thus have reason to authorize someone to make decisions about 
things on behalf of the rest of us in order to avoid a dilemma.”5 The institution 
of property ownership emerges as a response to that dilemma, or that 
coordination problem, and does so by assigning to individuals authority to 
 
4. Id. at 1450. 
5. Id. at 1478 (emphasis omitted). 
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resolve what Katz terms “the Basic Question”: “what (in their view) constitutes 
a worthwhile use of a thing.”6 I will call this defense of the institution of 
property ownership “the Ownership Theory.” Not only does it justify the 
introduction of property rights, it also sets limits on their scope. “A principle of 
abuse of property right simply marks the limit of that jurisdiction” that we 
have good reason to confer.7  
 In short, then, Katz advances the following two claims: 
 
The No-Intent-To-Harm Principle: an owner acts abusively (i.e., runs afoul 
of limitations that are built into the property rights she purports to exercise) if 
she uses a thing for the purpose of causing harm to another. 
 
The Ownership Theory: the legal-political institution of property rights is 
justified by, and only by, a society’s need to assign jurisdiction to answer the 
“Basic Question” of what is a worthwhile use of a thing. 
 
In addition, Katz grounds the No-Intent-To-Harm Principle in the 
Ownership Theory. The No-Intent-To-Harm principle is true only in virtue of 
the Ownership Theory. “The reason” for the principle of abuse of property 
right, Katz maintains, “lies in the political foundations of the office of 
ownership itself.”8 
i i .  the ownership theory:  some doubts 
There are at least two reasons to doubt Katz’s theory of the institution of 
ownership. First, Katz’s theory—the Ownership Theory—supports a broader 
limitation on the scope of property rights than the NITH Principle 
contemplates, and one that is considerably less plausible. Second, aside from its 
dubious upshot, the Ownership Theory puts forth an implausibly narrow 
picture of the problem that the institution of ownership is designed to resolve 
and of its point or value. 
 
A. The Uncertain Relevance of Harmful Intent  
 
 Katz does not purport to offer a sustained defense of the Ownership 
Theory, and what arguments she does present for that theory are highly 
 
6. Id. at 1450. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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telegraphic.9 But I suspect that many readers who find NITH plausible (or 
more than plausible) will take that plausibility to be good evidence in favor of 
the Ownership Theory. Of course, it would be fallacious to deduce the truth of 
the Ownership Theory from the (supposed) truth of NITH. Still, one might 
think this a sensible abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation. 
 I think, to the contrary, that the plausibility of NITH furnishes very weak 
support for the Ownership Theory. The problem is that the Ownership Theory 
actually entails that an owner’s use of a thing that is motivated by idiosyncratic 
reasons unconnected to judgments about “what would be a worthwhile use” of 
that thing is abusive even if those reasons do not involve intent to cause harm. As 
Katz explains:  “where the owner fails to take herself to be determining what 
constitutes a worthwhile use of a thing, she abuses her position of authority 
and either loses the law’s full protection or, in some cases, even attracts 
sanction.”10 This being so, the abuse-of-property principle that the Ownership 
Theory delivers does not proscribe a limited set of purposes (namely, intent to 
cause harm), but rather prescribes the reasons that must motivate property 
usage (namely, reasons that rest on judgments about what would be a 
worthwhile use or agenda for the property). The principle is better rendered, 
not as “No-Intent-To-Harm” (NITH), but as “Worthwhile-Uses-Only” 
(WUO). WUO implies NITH, but is much broader than NITH.  
A hypothetical example will make the difference between WUO and NITH 




Oswald was preparing to repaint his white house yellow. Before doing 
so, however, Oswald’s neighbor, Ned, volunteered how attractive he’d 
find Oswald’s house were it yellow. Oswald hates Ned. So he paints 
his house green. 
 
Here are two plausible observations about Green House. First, if, as most 
theorists believe, harm is a moralized or evaluative concept that is not reducible 
 
9. The heart of the Ownership Theory is the claim that “the reason owners have standing [to 
impose on others private decisions about things] is to perform a coordination function that 
all of us have reason to accept,” conjoined with both a view about precisely what that 
coordination function is, and a supposed moral principle that ownership authority must be 
constrained “to its narrowest scope consistent with discharging the coordination function.” 
Id. at 1472 (emphasis added). Defending all this is the burden of Part II.B, which covers 
something less than a page and a half. 
10. Id. at 1482.  
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to the mere non-provision of a benefit,11 then Oswald’s intent is only to 
withhold from Ned a benefit, not to inflict harm. Ned is not remotely likely to 
experience a setback to interests of the character or magnitude necessary to 
amount to a harm, on the most plausible accounts of that concept, and we have 
no basis to conclude that Oswald believed or intended otherwise. 
Second, and nonetheless, Oswald’s decision did not involve a judgment 
about what would be a worthwhile “use” of his home. Having identified a 
range of color choices that he would deem acceptable—or “worthwhile,” 
whatever that might mean, exactly—Oswald made a decision regarding the 
property he owns on the strength of only a single consideration: what color 
would be least likely to please his neighbor. Unless a use is necessarily 
“worthwhile” just so long as the owner has some reason for favoring it—a 
construal of “worthwhile” that would render the Basic Question entirely 
toothless—we should conclude that Oswald’s reasons for acting were not in 
keeping with the reasons why owners are granted authority to make decisions 
that “bind us all.”  
If these two judgments are correct, and if NITH fully constituted Katz’s 
abuse-of-property principle, then Oswald did not abuse his property rights—a 
conclusion that probably jibes with most people’s intuitions. But because Katz 
believes that the jurisdiction of a property owner extends only so far as she is 
answering the Basic Question, and because “[a] principle of abuse of property 
right simply marks the limits of that jurisdiction,”12 it must follow that Oswald 
did abuse his rights, for “[a]n owner exceeds her jurisdiction whenever her 
reasons for acting do not concern what she thinks is a worthwhile use of her 
property.”13 Or, again, “it is an abuse of right to exercise ownership authority 
for reasons other than the task with which owners are charged.”14 If the 
conclusion that Oswald’s action was ultra vires strikes you as implausible 
(regardless of whether you could muster good institutional or “pragmatic” 
reasons why no concrete legal consequences should attach), then you have 
reason to resist the Ownership Theory. 
Admittedly, this is not a decisive objection. You might find it more 
plausible than I do that Oswald’s conduct is abusive and that, as a result, he 
sacrifices some measure of “the law’s full protection.” Or perhaps Oswald 
doesn’t run afoul of the Worthwhile-Use-Only Principle because his reasoning 
did, in some respect, concern what is a worthwhile use. I do not know how that 
argument would run, largely because Katz is surprisingly silent about what is 
 
11. See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-36 (1984). Because Katz does not elaborate 
on the notion of harm in her essay, there is no way of knowing what conception of harm she 
means to employ. 
12. Katz, supra note 2, at 1450. 
13. Id. at 1464. 
14. Id. at 1465. 
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involved in making a judgment about a worthwhile use,15 but I wouldn’t rule it 
out as impossible. 
In case you are tempted by either of these outs, consider a second 
hypothetical. This is a little more fanciful than Green House, but even less 
susceptible to either of the two avenues of escape I have just identified. 
 
 Vase in Box 
 
Oscar owns a vase that he keeps on his mantle. He enjoys looking at 
it. One day, Oscar’s drunken friend, Fred, dares him to put it away. 
Why? “Just because,” says Fred. Not one to back off from a 
challenge, Oscar locks the vase in a box and stores it on a high shelf 
in his closet.  
 
 Surely Oscar’s locking his vase away harms nobody. Indeed, it is not clear 
that this case even involves the withholding of a benefit. (Oscar rarely 
entertains, and the few friends who have seen the vase think it ugly.) If NITH 
defines the scope of abuse of property right, then Oscar’s conduct is 
permissible and non-abusive. And yet Oscar is not motivated by a belief that 
locking the vase away in a box in his closet is “a worthwhile use” of it.16  The 
notion that such-and-such a use would be worthwhile is supposed to be an 
input to a decision regarding what to do with a thing, not an output. That is, 
an owner should opt for use φ as a consequence of a judgment that φ is a 
worthwhile use; she should not judge use φ to be worthwhile in consequence 
of a decision to undertake φ. Given that the Ownership Theory actually 
supports the broader principle Worthwhile-Uses-Only, and not only the 
narrower principle No-Intent-To-Harm, Oscar’s act of locking away his own 
vase would not fall within the scope of his property rights—if the Ownership 
Theory is sound.  
But surely Oscar’s property rights in the vase fully entitle him to lock it in a 
box in his closet.  If that is true—and its truth does not depend upon there 
 
15. Although I do not pursue the matter further given space constraints, I confess to finding this 
silence troubling. And Katz’s observation (made twice) that “reasons that go beyond the 
thing itself are ultra vires,” id. at 1472, 1479, does not clarify matters for me. Given the 
instrumental uses to which things are put, I do not know what is included in the set of 
reasons that extend only to “the thing itself,” and thus what is excluded. The image that 
most clearly emerges to me is that an owner should structure her practical reasoning such 
that she first poses the Basic Question with respect to each thing she owns and then guides 
her conduct in response to whatever answers she furnishes.  But this proposal strikes me as 
so transparently unpromising that I doubt it is Katz’s, hence my puzzlement. 
16. Katz takes pains to allow that an owner may defer to another’s judgment about worthwhile 
uses. Id. at 1459-63. This is not such a case: Fred did not believe that secreting the vase away 
would be a worthwhile use of it. 
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being a categorical and unqualified right to waste—then the Ownership Theory 
is not sound. 
 
B. The Uncertain Relevance of “the Basic Question” 
 
 My second worry about the Ownership Theory is more direct and more 
fundamental: people rarely make decisions regarding how to use their property 
on the basis that Katz’s theory supposes. Katz assumes that, absent property 
rights, we disagree among ourselves regarding “what is a worthwhile use” of 
some thing. Because that is the problem that the institution of ownership is 
designed to resolve, that is the question that owners are charged to address. An 
owner exceeds her jurisdiction when establishing an agenda for a thing she 
owns based on any other considerations.  
 Now, I am skeptical that the institution of property is best justified or 
explained in terms of any single value or need. My inclinations here are 
pluralist.17 But put that aside. Assuming arguendo that the institution of 
property law is justified by a single value, or is responsive to a concern that 
could be usefully formulated as a single “Basic Question,” that single question 
is almost certainly not “what is a worthwhile use of this thing?”  That form of 
question seeks to elicit the wrong sort of judgment. Members of a community 
can frequently agree regarding what is a worthwhile use of a given thing—this 
would be worthwhile, that would be worthwhile, the other would be 
worthwhile too. The problem is not that of deciding whether a given proposed 
use is or is not “worthwhile.”  The problem (or a large part of it) is that we 
cannot make use of a thing in all the ways that qualify as worthwhile. We must 
choose from among the set of worthwhile uses. The problem is a practical 
one—it concerns what to do—not a theoretical one concerning what to believe. 
This is not a quibble. Katz conceives of ownership as an institution devoted 
almost exclusively to solving the theoretical problem that we have divergent 
views regarding what is or is not “worthwhile.” Such an orientation leads her 
to emphasize “the importance of enabling the office of ownership to serve as a 
clearinghouse for ideas about the use of things.”18 But she overlooks the fact 
that even a single person’s judgments about this matter of evaluative fact will 
often underdetermine an answer to the question she confronts—namely, what 
is to be done. As a consequence, Katz’s narrow focus upon her “Basic 
Question” obscures from view the extent to which property rights, by allowing 
owners to make choices and carry out plans, enable us to refine and satisfy our 
 
17. Those inclinations are considerably strengthened by the powerful and nuanced defense of a 
pluralist theory of property institutions put forth in HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES 
AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).  
18. Katz, supra note 2, at 1462 (emphasis added). 
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preferences, hone our talents and capacities, and exert our wills upon the 
world. We constitute ourselves in part by exercising our wills free from 
interference by others, and property rights play a significant role in that project 
of self-constitution. 
One might try to moot the challenge I have just raised by simply reframing 
the Basic Question from “what is a worthwhile use of this thing?” to “what is 
the most worthwhile use of this thing?” Indeed, a few passages suggest that 
this is what Katz really had in mind all along. For example, when discussing a 
decision that enjoined as a nuisance a property owner’s noisemaking conducted 
in order to pressure a neighboring couple to stop their own music playing, Katz 
approves the result on the grounds that “[t]he question [the defendant] put to 
himself was not how best to use his property, but rather how most effectively 
to force the plaintiffs to cease their musical enterprises.”19 Plausibly, “how best 
should this property be used?” is roughly equivalent to “what is this property’s 
most worthwhile use?” 
This hoped-for fix would not solve the problem I am raising. Preliminarily, 
as a matter of Katz exegesis, the idea that the Basic Question an owner must 
answer is only whether some use is a worthwhile one, and not whether it is the 
most worthwhile, does not appear to be an accident or oversight. The exact 
phrase “a worthwhile use” appears over twenty times in an article of fewer than 
forty pages. More substantively, to demand that owners base their use-
decisions on judgments about what would be most worthwhile or optimal 
would be a recipe for paralysis. It is unavoidable that we frequently must act in 
the face of options that we cannot rank order on any remotely objective metric 
such as “worthwhileness.” This is true whether the decision involves how to 
use our things or how to spend the weekend. Moreover, many theorists would 
prize this state of affairs, not bemoan it. People’s inability to resolve all 
questions of what to do by the exercise of judgment facilitates the development 
of our individuality as willing agents.  We become who we are in part by 
choosing life projects and embarking on courses of action that the demands of 
rationality alone do not, as it were, select for us. 
i i i .  grounding an abuse of property right:  of  internal 
and external l imits  
If Katz’s Ownership Theory is doubtful as a political justification for the 
institution of property ownership, then it cannot feature in a defense of the 
NITH Principle. But this would not entail that the NITH Principle (or a close 
analogue) is false, for it could rest on other grounds. Here is a straightforward 
possibility: first, it is morally wrong (pro tanto) to cause harm to another 
 
19. Id. at 1464. 
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knowingly; and second, our law adopts or accommodates that moral principle, 
allowing it to help shape the contours of legal rights.  
Although it is not absolutely clear what reason Katz might have for 
rejecting or disfavoring this alternative proposal, a possible explanation can be 
teased out of her announced preference for an “internal” rather than “external” 
restriction on property rights. Katz does not quite define “internal” or external” 
limits, but the distinction appears to be, roughly, that the former are supplied 
by the very reasons or considerations that affirmatively justify the institution of 
property ownership, whereas the latter arise from general moral or legal 
principles that are not particular to property law and theory but cut across legal 
departments. In several places, Katz announces that an internal limitation is 
preferable or superior to an external one.20 
If my first pass at the internal/external distinction is roughly accurate, then 
it would seem that the (wholly unremarkable) proposal I am floating—that 
property rights are in some measure circumscribed by moral principles against 
harming others—falls on the external side of the line.21 What remains unclear is 
what is not to like about external limits. 
As best I can tell, Katz offers only one argument against externally 
generated limits on property rights or their exercise: that a restriction on 
property rights must be internal to avoid the paradox that, at the same time, 
one can have a right to φ, and one’s doing φ could be “abusive” hence 
impermissible.22 Katz is right to want to avoid that odd or paradoxical 
conclusion. But this desideratum does not foreclose external restrictions. Katz 
offers no reason why the contours of specific legal rights, including the specific 
legal rights that collectively define the set of “property rights,” cannot be set by 
the interplay between reasons, values, or principles that provide affirmative 
 
20. Katz particularly emphasizes both the difference between internal and external limits and 
her preference for the former when contrasting her analysis and defense of abuse of property 
right with accounts offered by Ernest Weinrib, Daniel Kelly, Joseph Perillo, and Henry 
Smith. See id. at 1447 n.5 (allowing that these other scholars have offered “valuable 
perspectives on the problems of spite and extortion,” but observing that “they assume a 
certain normative framework that incompletely accounts for the internal limits on 
ownership authority,” and further contending that “it is important to consider abuse of 
property right specifically in light of the idea of ownership and so apart from its analogues 
in other areas of law”). 
21. There is a possible intimation in Katz that it is definitional, and not merely illustrative, of an 
external approach that it “balance[s] harm against social utility.” Id. at 1456. My suggestion 
that NITH or something like it reflects the legalization of a moral principle against harming 
others would not qualify as external on this definition. But then it would be even harder to 
see what reason Katz provides for resisting it.  
22. Id. at 1456 & n.34. To be clear, the notion that rights are sometimes exercised “abusively” is 
not itself hard to accept. A paradox seems to arise only insofar as such abusive exercise is not 
permitted by the lights of the very same normative system that purports to recognize the 
right in question. 
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support for some such right and competing or opposing reasons, values, or 
principles, even of a very general character. 
Indeed, an external restriction on property rights grounded in general 
moral principles can probably perform the function that Katz wants a principle 
of abuse of property right to serve better than her preferred internal approach 
does. Katz emphasizes that a principle of abuse of property right is just that—a 
principle.23 Because, as Dworkin famously taught, principles have a dimension 
of weight,24 the abuse-of-property-right principle can shape different doctrinal 
responses in different property contexts. In some contexts, an owner is barred 
from using her property for the purpose of harming another; other times such 
use is permitted but will not be aided by the full panoply of judicial remedies 
that a property owner can usually call upon. This state of affairs is just what to 
expect if the abuse-of-right principle in property law were, in essence, the 
partial legalization of a moral principle against harming others. It is less clear 
that Katz’s internal approach can similarly generate a limitation that functions 
as a principle. Katz’s limitation on property rights arises from the claimed fact 
that the reasons alone capable of supporting property institutions simply run 
out. As she explains, “we must constrain . . . ownership authority to its 
narrowest scope consistent with discharging the coordination function. That is 
why reasons that go beyond the thing itself are ultra vires.”25 That is also why 
she dubs her approach not only “internal,” but also “jurisdictional.” But if 
owners lack lawful power to use their things for the purpose of harming others, 
then it is unclear what allows for the context-sensitivity that Katz endorses.26 
Jurisdictional norms are generally understood to take the form of rules, not of 
principles. 
iv .  beyond property 
Let us leave property law for the moment and consider the criminal law. If 
you know (counterfactually!) that I am having an affair, you may tell my wife. 
I am not (absent other facts) legally or morally entitled to your silence, and you 
are not legally or morally obligated to keep mum. Yet if you offer me your 
silence on condition that I pay $10,000, you have committed the legal and 
moral wrong denominated “blackmail.” How it can be wrongful to threaten 
what one has a right to do has confounded criminal law scholars, moral 
 
23. See supra note 3. 
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978). 
25. Katz, supra note 2, at 1479.  
26. See, e.g., id. at 1449. 
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philosophers, and economists for generations.27 I believe that a solution to this 
puzzle will both lend support to the notion that rights, including property 
rights, are sometimes circumscribed by an actor’s reasons for action, and help 
us think through the precise content of the abuse-of-property principle.  
My proposed solution to the puzzle has two components: a claim about the 
scope of our expressive rights, and a claim about the probative value of a 
conditional offer of silence.28 First, I deny that the action that a blackmailer 
threatens is something that, categorically, he has a right to do. On my view, the 
correct principle governing the permissible scope of criminal libel is roughly 
this: a person exceeds or “abuses” her rights by disclosing information that she 
foresees will be harmful to another’s reputation unless she genuinely believes 
that the balance of morally relevant considerations renders the disclosure 
justified all things considered. 
Of course, it will ordinarily be hard to know upon which beliefs and 
motives someone acted when revealing reputation-harming information about 
another. That’s where the second piece of my preferred analysis comes in. The 
fact of a prior conditional offer of silence is frequently good evidence 
(depending upon many particulars, of course) that the subsequent disclosure, 
made after the conditional offer is rebuffed, is not animated by a bona fide 
belief that it is morally warranted despite the harm it will cause. Assuredly, this 
is not a deduction. It is an inference and thus necessarily defeasible. Its 
strength will be highly context-sensitive But putting the epistemic challenge 
aside, the key claim remains that if a blackmailer threatens to disclose 
information that he would understand to be harmful and that he would not 
believe to be morally justified by the balance of reasons, then what he threatens 
is not within his rights to carry out. It is sometimes said that blackmail 
criminalizes actions that one has a “perfect right” to do.29 That is precisely 
what my solution to the blackmail paradox denies. Reasons matter. 
Does this account of blackmail’s proper criminalization suggest that 
property rights too are sensitive to an owner’s reasons for using her property 
this way or that? Katz rightly notes that “[o]wnership is generally seen as 
 
27. For a rich sampling of commentary, see Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565-1989 
(1993). 
28. See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 37 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary 
Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998) [hereinafter, 
Berman, The Evidentiary Theory]. Although I believe that my account of blackmail has 
gained more support than any competing account, I fully acknowledge that it is far from 
having achieved the status of settled wisdom.  
29. See, e.g., Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass’n, [1937] A.C. 797, 806 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (“The ordinary blackmailer normally threatens to do what he has a perfect right to 
do—namely, communicate some compromising conduct to a person whose knowledge is 
likely to affect the person threatened.”). 
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conferring a bargaining chip. . . . An owner is in a position to sell an easement, 
a license to use or to access her property, or a promise to forbear from an 
undesirable activity.”30 But forbearance from an undesirable activity is precisely 
what a blackmailer offers. Usually that undesirable activity is the 
communication of embarrassing information, but it could be something else: 
“informational blackmail” is not redundant and “noninformational blackmail” 
is not oxymoronic.31 The leverage cases that interest Katz, then, are not 
analogous to blackmail; they are blackmail.  
Notice, though, that my account of blackmail endorses a limitation on the 
exercise of the right to reveal secrets that is somewhat more constraining than 
the NITH Principle that Katz favors. NITH constrains owners’ authority to use 
their property for the purpose of causing harm to others. On my account of 
blackmail, an “owner” of information exceeds her rights of disclosure when she 
foresees that doing so will cause harm, unless she believes that the disclosure is 
morally warranted, all things considered. Perhaps my account is mistaken. But 
if it is correct, does it teach that the exercise of rights in tangible property is 
likewise constrained by a principle more biting than NITH—that is, by a 
knowledge-based constraint, not a purpose-based one? 
Not necessarily. Recall my suggestion that property rights might be shaped 
in part by moral principles that enjoin us not to harm others. If moral 
principles contribute to the contours of property rights but do not, all by 
themselves, determine the rights’ contours, then we should expect the precise 
contours of property rights to be sensitive to the particular considerations that 
nourish or give rise to rights regarding property in the first place. Put another 
way, the precise reasons for which an exercise of a given right should be 
deemed abusive or not within the right’s scope are partially but not fully 
determined by domain-specific considerations. It is plausibly part of the 
purpose or value of property rights that they serve to demarcate domains of 
unusually robust freedom of action. Therefore, NITH might indeed cabin the 
exercise of property rights—or of some of them—even if reason-based 
limitations on the exercise of other rights are more restrictive than NITH itself.  
Whether that is so or not, the important point is that the external account I 
favor highlights a deep connection between abuse of property right 
and informational blackmail that Katz’s account, due its internal or 
“jurisdictional” character, cannot see. Furthermore, the external account 
sensitizes us to the possibility that NITH-like principles apply elsewhere too. 
Consider constitutional law. The unconstitutional conditions problem 
arises whenever the state offers a benefit (i.e., some goodie the provision of 
which is not constitutionally required) on condition that the recipient waive 
 
30. Katz, supra note 2, at 1459 (emphasis added). 
31. For a brief discussion, see Berman, The Evidentiary Theory, supra note 28, at 866-67. 
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some constitutional protection or exercise a right in a manner that the state 
could not mandate. Famously, this problem arises across the constitutional 
spectrum. For example, government offers welfare funds on condition that 
recipients waive specified Fourth Amendment protections; land use bodies 
offer zoning variances on condition that property owners relinquish particular 
property rights or grant easements that the state could not command (without 
paying just compensation); prosecutors offer reduced sentences or charges on 
condition that defendants waive their rights to plead not guilty and to put the 
prosecution to its burden of proof. These and similar offers describe a problem 
or puzzle because the universal agreement that some such proposals are 
unconstitutional is in tension with the widespread intuition that if what is 
offered is indeed a “benefit” that the government need not provide, then it may 
be withheld for any reason at all. 
That latter intuition, however, parallels what is said in the informational 
blackmail cases—namely, that one’s right to disclose embarrassing information 
about another entails that one may disclose the information for any reason—
and is equally fallacious. It is far more plausible, I have argued elsewhere, that 
the state may not withhold a benefit for the purpose of making exercise of a 
constitutional right more costly, either to punish the rightholder for exercising 
her right in a way that the state disfavors or to deter other similarly situated 
rightholders from doing so. To do so—that is, to treat a rightholder less well 
for exercising her right than one otherwise would, in order to raise the cost of 
that exercise—is to “penalize” exercise of the right, and it is concomitant to the 
existence of a constitutional right that the correlative duty-holder not penalize 
its exercise. Put another way, what we may fairly call “the anti-penalty 
principle” holds that the state may not take the anticipated fact that some 
action (here, nonprovision of a benefit) would make exercise of a right more 
costly as a reason to favor that action.32  
Take a highly unrealistic example. Surely it would be unconstitutional for 
the state to condition eligibility for school lunches on the commitment of a 
child’s mother not to have an abortion. Why? A quick answer is that there is no 
nexus or germaneness between the benefit and the condition. But germaneness 
is better understood as an evidentiary tool, not as a constitutional requirement. 
The conditional provision of a benefit would be unconstitutional because if the 
state were to withhold the offered benefit on failure of the stated condition, 
then it would be acting for the purpose of making exercise of the abortion right 
more costly, not merely acting with the knowledge that nonprovision of the 
 
32. For elaboration and defense of this claim see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and 
the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1283, 1316-33 (2013) [hereinafter Berman, Medicaid Expansion]; Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion 
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 32-36 
(2001) [hereinafter, Berman, Coercion Without Baselines]. 
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benefit would make exercise of the abortion right more costly. Lack of 
germaneness between condition and offered benefit is significant in practical 
terms because and insofar as it helps license the inference that, when it 
proceeds to withhold the benefit on failure of condition, the state would be 
doing so not despite the fact that withholding would raise the costs of exercising 
a right, but because of it.  
This is just the heart of a solution to the unconstitutional conditions 
problem, not the full account, which could not be elaborated and defended in 
this short space.33 The point of importance is that the anti-penalty principle at 
the heart of the analysis mirrors, almost precisely, the NITH principle that 
Katz invokes to circumscribe the exercise of property rights. Owners, says Katz, 
may not use their property for the purpose of harming others, either because 
they value the harm as a good in itself or for the further purpose of 
incentivizing others to act as the owner wishes. Governments, according to the 
solution to the unconstitutional conditions problem on offer, may not threaten 
to withhold benefits for the purpose of raising the cost of exercising 
constitutional rights, either because the government treats exercise of the right 
as a wrong that warrants punishment or for the further purpose of 
incentivizing other rightholders to acquiesce in the government’s demands.34 
Our law’s concern for reasons for action runs broader and deeper than courts 
and commentators generally acknowledge. Katz’s defense of a principle of 
abuse of property is therefore a useful corrective. It would be more valuable 
still, as well as more secure, if the principle were rooted in more general, 
“external” considerations than in a highly doubtful analysis of property law’s 
foundations. 
 
Mitchell N. Berman is Leon Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of 
Pennsylvania (formerly Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, The University of 
Texas at Austin). For very helpful comments on a previous draft, the author would 
like to thank Sam Buell, Peter Cane, Hanoch Dagan, Henry Smith, and Larissa 
Katz. He would also like to thank the Yale Law Journal Forum Committee for doing 
him a kindness. 
 
Preferred Citation: Mitchell N. Berman, Abuse of Property Right Without 




33. For more complete analysis of the problem see Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra 
note 32. 
34. See, e.g., Berman, Medicaid Expansion, supra note 32, at 1322 (“[G]overnment may not 
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